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ABSTRACT
In the course of understanding a text, different readers use
different lli££l£D££ StI£X£3l££ to guide their choice of
interpretations of the events in the text. This is in contrast
to previous computer models of understanding, which all use the
same (single) strategy while concentrating on details of
content-driven inference. The separate strategies are theorized
to be composed of the same jCDJIU?DD£JJi lli££l£li££ SlSi£££S£Sr but of
different rules for application of the processes. The use of
different strategies occasionally results in different
interpretations of a single text. This paper presents both the
results of new experimental data and a working computer program,
called STRATEGIST, that models both strategy-driven and
content-driven inference behavior. The rules which make up two
of these strategies are presented.
1.0 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence models of human understanding have
implicitly assumed a single strategy of inference behavior. The
integrated understander's strategy usually goes:
This research was supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under grant 1ST-81-20685 and by the Naval Ocean
Systems Center under contract N00123-81-C-1078.
1. While reading a sentence, make as many inferences
as possible.
2. Connect inferences from the two sentences.
However, we have observed that not all readers make
interpretations of text which conform to this strategy. For
example, subjects in our recent experiments (Granger & Holbrook,
1983) read the following story:
[1] Nancy went to see a romantic movie. She was depressed.
Our experiments show that different individuals who read this
story had two significantly different interpretations: (1) Nancy
went to the movie to be entertained, and the movie depressed her
(perhaps because it was romantic), vs. (2) something before the
movie depressed Nancy, and she went to the movie to cheer up.
Our experiments have indicated that at least two different
iuJ££j:£DiC£ for interpreting text exist. However, these
strategies are so closely related that, most of the time, readers
using different strategies will come up with the same
interpretation of the events related in the text.
We theorize that the same jjifsjrsixss
which comprise each inference strategy are available to all
readers. The difference in the strategies lies in the different
rules used to apply the component processes. This paper presents
these theorized processes and rules in a prototype model, called
STRATEGIST, which exhibits the observed behavior of human
readers.
Several researchers (e«9*r Schank & AbelscHf 1977) have
hypothesized inference processes which allow the reader to
interpret tezt* Psychological experiments such as those
conducted by Graesser (1981), Rumelhart (1981), and Seifert,
Robertson, and Black (1982) have determined when in the
understanding process various types of inferences ate made.
However, these experiments were not designed to study the
differences in processes which our experiments have discovered.
The results of many of these studies can be reinterpreted in
light of our results. The programs which were written to emulate
human inference behavior (e.g., Wilensky, 1978; Granger, 1980;
Wilensky, 1983) have also failed to model this particular aspect
of inference decisions.
2.0 Background
Many story understanding systems have been written which can
easily interpret simple text. Recall the example story;
[1] Nancy went to see a romantic movie. She was depressed.
PAM (Wilensky, 1978) would interpret this story by assuming that
Nancy has the goal of entertaining herself. Going to the movie
is Nancy's plan for satisfying this goal. PAM would try to fit
Nancy's depressed state into the plan that was executed, probably
by inferring that the movie was depressing, or that the movie was
not entertaining, and that she was depressed because she could
not fulfill her goal. BORIS (Dyer, 1980) would come up with the
same interpretation for the same reasons, even though it employs
more complex knowledge structures. MACARTHUR (Granger, 1981)
would be able to come up with both interpretations, but would
always generate the same initial interpretation as the other
systems.
These systems have all worked from a basic set of premises
which include two types of rules. are rules
which generate inferences on the basis of the understander's
specific knowledge of the situation described in the text.
g^rategy-j|j_iyep are rules which generate inferences or
suppress content-driven inferences using extra-textual
considerations. In other words, the strategy-driven inferences
themselves define the specific context of the situation described
in the text. Humans understand stories using an
which applies the content-driven rules, as well as the
strategy-driven rules specific to their behavior. The kinds of
inferences generated by both types of rules include
lJi££l3JiS£3' These inferences explain why the stated events
occurred. In other words, explanatory inferences are adding to
the context. (For example, goals can be explanatory inferences
with respect to intentional actions.) If explanatory inferences
add enough context, they can give rise to In^sisnssst
expectations about the events which will occur in the text.
Plans are examples of predictions from goals. (Predictive
inferences always 'look ahead' to account for some new input in
the text; reciprocally, inIsiSJiSSS are those plan
inferences that look backward from an explanatory goal inference
to account for previous events in the text.)
The following set of rules is content-driven, and used by
all readers to understand text:
Cl. As a sentence is parsed, try to fit newinput/conceptualizations into existing context.
C2. If inferences conflict with specific statements in
the text, the specific statements rule out the
inferences, which are supplanted by
interpretations which do not conflict with the
specific statements.
All readers verify understanding by satisfying
which the Inference Manager applies to the
interpretation. There are at least, two such evaluation metrics:
Ml. All events should be causally related to each
other (Cohesion).
M2. Make the least complex interpretation of events
possible (Parsimony — Granger, 1980).
Our experiments have found that many subjects will indeed
interpret story [1] as the systems described earlier do. We call
people who come up with this interpretation Our
data indicate that Perseverers will make inferences as soon as
possible when reading text. These early inferences are the
context in which further events are interpreted. Such readers
persevere with an inference until a contradictory event or
concept forces a change of interpretation. These are the
Perseverer's strategy-driven rules:
PSl. If there is no previous context, make default
inferences.
PS2. Inferences should always be as specific as
possible. (Wilensky, 1983)
The Perseverer's set of strategy-driven rules is used by all of
the systems discussed above.
Applying these rules, this is how we hypothesize that a
Perseverer would go about interpreting story [1]:
INPUT: Nancy went to see a romantic movie.
Application of Cl: This is the first sentence, so
there is no previous context to constrain inferences.
Several low-level inferences, basically an unstated
part of the sentence, are made (e.g. Nancy not only
went to the movie theater, but saw the movie as well).
Application of PSl and PS2: These default inferences
which are made are as specific as possible. The most
important for our purposes is the explanatory inference
that generates a goal to explain why Nancy went to the
movie. This default goal is that Nancy wanted to be
entertained by the movie. This explanatory inference
gives rise to several predictive inferences, among
them, the expectation that Nancy was happier after she
saw the movie.
INPUT: She was depressed.
Application of PSl: Because there is previous context,
Cl applies. The reader tries to fit this new sentence
into the existing context which the predictive
inferences set up (Nancy was happier after she saw the
movie).
Application of C2: The predictive inference that Nancy
was happier must be supplanted with the specific
knowledge that Nancy was depressed. The explanatory
inference need not be supplanted, but the reader must
realize that Nancy's goal of happiness was not
fulfilled.
Application of Ml and M2: The most parsimonious
explanation of the story is that Nancy's goal of
happiness was not fulfilled because her goal of
entertainment was not fulfilled. This explanation is
also cohesive.
Note that Ml is constantly being applied to the two
sentences, as connections are searched for. Notice also that
there are other interpretations which do not assume that the goal
of entertainment wasn't fulfilled — for example, Nancy may have
enjoyed the movie so much that she was depressed because it
ended. However, this is not the most parsimonious
interpretation.
There is a different initial interpretation which subjects
in our experiments made, which is as plausible as the
interpretation made by the Perseverers and all of the systems
mentioned above. This interpretation is that Nancy was depressed
before she saw the movie, and went to the movie to cheer up. We
call people who make this interpretation es» Recencies
are readers who delay making inferences until enough information
is present. A basic rule which drives this strategy iS; when
more text is available, and the text is ambiguous, leave a
£lld (Granger, 1980), because later text will explain earlier
events. The most recent inference will then become the context
in which the earlier text is interpreted. To arrive at this
alternate interpretation, a Recency must have a different set of
strategy-driven rules from that of the Perseverer, which the
Inference Manager applies;
RSI. If there is no active context, only low-level
goals are to be inferred.
RS2. If there is no more text, inferences should be as
specific as possible.
RS3. If there is more text, leave a loose end.
Applying these rules, this is how we hypothesize that a
Recency would process story [1]:
INPUT: Nancy went to see a romantic movie.
Application of Cl: This is the first sentence, so
there is no context to direct inferencing.
Application of RSI and RS3: Only low-level inferences
are made (e.g. Nancy saw the movie). There is more
text, so inferences are left as unspecified as
possible, and loose ends are left rather than
generating explanatory and predictive inferences.
INPUT: She was depressed.
Application of Cl: The only existing context is
low-level.
Application of RS2: There is no more text, so specific
explanatory and predictive inferences must be made from
the present concept. The most important explanatory
inference for our purposes is that Nancy has a goal of
alleviating her depression, and the predictive
inference which follows is that Nancy will do something
to alleviate her depression.
Application of C2: The causal relation is ambiguous,
so the goal-based predictive inference (that Nancy will
do something to alleviate her depression) is
maintained, and a search is conducted for something in
the text which can serve as this plan. Going to the
movie fulfills this predictive inference, and so the
final interpretation of the text is that Nancy went to
the movie to cheer up.
Application of Ml and M2: The events are related to
each other (Causal Cohesion satisfied). The fewest
number of inferences were used to relate the events to
one another (Parsimony satisfied).
Although the explanation of rule application appears to have
applied the rules in a particular orderr we do not have any
theories about rule ordering. The rules are probably applied as
they become appropriate, but there is not necessarily a linear
order for application.
These two different strategies may seem to describe
different sets of component processes altogether. This is
deceptive; the processes are strikingly similar. The evaluation
metrics which both strategies use are the same; Causal Cohesion
must be satisfied for both strategies, although the cause/effect
chains are different. Furthermore, both interpretations are
parsimonious. There is no evidence that either strategy cannot
make particular types of inferences. Both strategies make
ns££SS31S inferences, such as connecting referents, inferring
that Nancy went inside the theater, bought the ticket, and saw
the movie (see Seifert et al., 1982, for discussion). We
theorize that both strategies also make use of the same knowledge
representations. Both strategies generate explanatory inferences
and predictive inferences. With both interpretations, the
inferences that are made affect the interpretation of other
events.
It is the strategy-driven mechanism that drives the ongoing
decision to either apply or suppress particular content-based
inferences during understanding. Thus, on a given text, the same
(potential) content-based inferences will be available regardless
of strategy, but, depending on the strategy used, some of those
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"available" inferences will be generated while others will not,
strategist's Inference Manager can apply the text-interpretation
rules of either strategy, and so can derive either interpretation
of an ambiguous text.
Following is a brief summary of the steps Perseverers and
Recencies take during the processing of both the Nancy text and
its reverse:
Text IF (Forwards);
Nancy went to see a romantic movie.
She was depressed.
Perseverer understanding steps:
1, Explanatory inference of goal (be entertained)
2, Predictive inferences from goal (see-movie plan will succeed
in satisfying entertainment goal)
3, Unsuccessful search for connection between 'plan success'
postdiction and 'depression' affect
4, Successful search for connection between alternate 'plan
failure' postdiction and 'depression' affect
Recency understanding steps:
1, Leave loose end from first sentence
2, Explanatory inference of goal from 2nd sentence (alleviate
depression)
3, Postdictive inference from goal (plan for
alleviate-depression)
4, Successful search for connection between plan and event (see
movie)
Text IB (Backwards):
Nancy was depressed.
She went to see a romantic movie.
Perseverer understanding steps:
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1. Explanatory inference of goal (alleviate depression)
2. Predictive inferences from goal (plan for
alleviate-depression)
3. Successful search for connection between plan and event (see
movie)
Recency understanding steps:
1. Explanatory inference of goal from 2nd sentence (be
entertained)
2. Postdictive inferences from goal (see-movie plan will succeed
in satisfying entertainment goal)
3. Unsuccessful search for connection between 'plan success'
postdiction and 'depression' affect
4. Successful search for connection between alternate 'plan
failure' postdiction and 'depression' affect
There are two crucial things to note. The first is that
precisely the same content inferences are made in the same
circumstances by both Recencies and Perseverers? the only
difference is they make them. It is only that difference
that leads to the differences in eventual interpretation. The
second is that Perseverer behavior on text IF and Recency
behavior on text IB are almost identical to each other;
reciprocally, Perseverer behavior on text IB and Recency behavior
on text IF are almost identical.
3.0 Operation of the STRATEGIST prototype
The following represents actual annotated run-time output of
the STRATEGIST program. First we examine STRATEGIST'S behavior
as a Perseverer. The input to the program is the Conceptual
Dependency representation (Schank & Abelson, 1977) of the
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following story:
[2] Melissa began to cry. Tyler had just asked her to
marry him.
:processing as perseverer
:the story is:
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(TO MELISSA) (FROM TYLER))
:processing next concept:
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
:attempting inference generation
:inferring from: MELISSA
:no context found
:default inference selected:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(DO-X (ACTOR MELISSA))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
:inferring from: TEARS
;no context found
:default inference selected:
(DO-X (ACTOR PACTORO))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEC))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
STRATEGIST searches for existing inferences (i.e., the context
which constrains the current inference generation) which might
connect with the inferences to be generated. No existing,
applicable context is found, so STRATEGIST searches for any
inferences associated with TEARS in the context of an EXPEL. It
finds a default inference that someone has done something which
made Melissa unhappy and caused her to cry tears of sadness.
(Note that if this inference later turns out to be incompatible
with some subsequent inference, it may be supplanted [Granger,
1980] and an alternative inference used.)
:end of inference generation
:processing next concept:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(TO MELISSA) (FROM TYLER))
All inferencing has been completed for the first
conceptualization, so STRATEGIST begins inference generation for
the next conceptualization. The inferences generated from the
first conceptualization provide the context in which the next
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conceptualization will be interpreted.
:attempting inference generation
:inferring from: TYLER
:no context found
:default inference selected:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))
(DO-X (ACTOR TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
:inferring from: PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
:context found
:possible inferences are:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(PROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ REJECT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE NEG))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEG))
STRATEGIST finds that an applicable context does exist for
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE, so it looks at the possible predictive
inferences for PROPOSE-MARRIAGE: that Tyler proposes, Melissa
accepts, and both are happy, or that Tyler proposes, Melissa
rejects his offer, and both are unhappy,
:found matching inference
:resulting merged inference is:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ REJECT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE NEG))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEG))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
The inference that Melissa rejected Tyler's proposal and she is
unhappy connects with the previously made predictive inference
that Melissa was crying because someone did something which made
her unhappy. The new inference chain which results is then
stored as a predictive inference which will be applied to future
inference generation,
rend of inference generation
rend of processing
rfinal representation isr
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(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(DO-X (ACTOR MELISSA))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
(A-HAPPINBSS (PLANNER TYLER))
(DO-X (ACTOR TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR: TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ REJECT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE NEC))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEC))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
STRATEGIST finishes processing the story and prints the
inferences it has made. The first two inference chains listed
above show that both Tyler and Melissa had goals of achieving
happiness, but their goals were unfulfilled. The last chain
indicates the order of actual events as STRATEGIST inferred them:
that Tyler proposed, Melissa said "no", both were unhappy, and
Melissa cried.
STRATEGIST can be told to apply the Recency strategy by
changing the value of a parameter. This in turn invokes a
process which postpones the processing of input until the end of
the input is detected. We now examine the operation of
STRATEGIST as a Recency:
:processing as recency
:the story is:
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(TO MELISSA) (FROM TYLER))
:processing next concept:
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
:leaving loose end
:processing next concept:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(TO MELISSA) (FROM TYLER))
:leaving loose end
:end of input story
Behaving as a Recency, STRATEGIST postpones high—level inference
generation until no input remains to be processed. It then
begins to generate inferences from the input conceptualizations
in last-in-first-out order.
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:processing previous loose end:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(TO MELISSA) (FROM TYLER))
:attempting inference generation
:inferring from: TYLER
:no context found
:default inference selected:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))
(DO-X (ACTOR TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
The default inference for TYLER becomes the context for further
inferencing.
:inferring from: PROPOSE-MARRIAGE
:context found
:possible inferences are:
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ REJECT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE NEG))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEG))
:found matching inference
:resulting merged inference is:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
STRATEGIST now finds the same two possible inferences for
PROPOSE-MARRIAGE that it did while behaving as a Persevererf but
this time finds that the previously made explanatory inference
that Tyler wanted to be happy connects with the possible
inference that Melissa accepts Tyler's proposal and both actors
are happy. The resulting connected inference chain is stored in
memory and serves as the context for later inferencing. Contrast
this with strategist's behavior as a Persevererf in which it was
inferred that Melissa rejected Tyler's proposal and was unhappy
because of the existing context that Melissa was crying because
of her unhappiness.
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:end of inference generation
:processing previous loose end:
(EXPElr (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS) )
:attempting inference generation
:inferring from: MELISSA
: context found
:possible inferences are:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(DO-X (ACTOR MELISSA))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
:found matching inference
:resulting merged inference is:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
STRATEGIST finds that the default goal of Melissa's wanting to be
happy coincides with the existing context.
:inferring from: TEARS
:context found
tpossible inferences are:
(DO-X (ACTOR PACTORO))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE NEG))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
(DO-X (ACTOR 7ACTORO))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE PCS))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
:found matching inference
;resulting merged inference is:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
Heref STRATEGIST finds that the possible inference of Melissa's
crying tears of joy coincides with the existing context. Once
again, contrast this with the Perseverer behavior above in which
STRATEGIST selected the default inference of Melissa's crying
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tears of sadness.
:end of Inference generation
:end of processing
:final representation is:
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER TYLER))
(MTRANS (ACTOR TYLER) (MOBJ PROPOSE-MARRIAGE)
(FROM TYLER) (TO MELISSA))
(A-HAPPINESS (PLANNER MELISSA))
(MTRANS (ACTOR MELISSA) (MOBJ ACCEPT)
(FROM MELISSA) (TO TYLER))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR TYLER) (VALUE POS))
(MENT-ST (ACTOR MELISSA) (VALUE POS))
(EXPEL (ACTOR MELISSA) (OBJECT TEARS))
STRATEGIST ends processing, its final representation indicating
that all inferences were connected. The inferred explanation for
the events related to STRATEGIST is that both Tyler and Melissa
wanted to be happy, Tyler asked Melissa to marry him, Melissa
said "yes", both actors were happy, and Melissa cried.
4.0 Interesting Observations
One problem that this model addresses is determining which
of two equally plausible and parsimonious interpretations will be
selected. Along these lines, Schank et al. explain such
misunderstanding in verbal communication by "...maintaining that
deriving a point is a part of processing, specifically related to
the choice of an 'inference path.' Understanders choose to
process idiosyncratically" (Schank et al., 1982, p. 263). This
explanation of deriving a point agrees with our theory of
inference paths. However, rather than believing understanders'
processing to be idiosyncratic, our model predicts that
individuals will tend to follow a single strategy consistently,
rather than arbitrarily switching from path to path.
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Behavior of Recencies and Perseverers is notable because it
supports the theory that the strategies use the same component
processes to interpret text. For example, both strategies see a
single interpretation of the text. In some cases, when the
alternate interpretation is pointed out, subjects will protest
that the alternate interpretation is implausible, based on the
way events were presented, regardless of the strategy they
employed. Our experiments also indicate that readers using the
two different strategies will reverse their interpretation of
events if the order of events in the text is reversed.
Readers using either strategy can be forced to switch to the
opposite strategy. For example, the typical experimental method
for studying inference decisions presents a text to the subject a
sentence at a time, and asks the subject what inferences were
made after each sentence. If a Recency is given text one line at
a time, so that no cues about the existence of further events can
be used, his interpretation will be the same as a Perseverer's,
even for those stories which would normally result in a different
interpretation. Thus, the data collected will not reveal the
different strategies. It is only when subjects are allowed to
read a full text, and not forced to make inferences by the
experimenter, that the different strategies can be observed. In
fact, previous researchers (e.g., Rumelhart, 1981; Seifert,
Robertson, & Black, 1982) have used a line-at-a-time methodology
for studying when and which inferences will be made. In
Rumelhart's (1981) experiments, subjects read a text a sentence
® time. After each sentence, the subject was asked for his
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current interpretation of the text. When Rumelhart compared the
interpretations of the texts by subjects who read the text a
sentence at a time to the interpretations of subjects who read
the full text and were not asked for their interpretations until
after completing the textf he found that the subjects who read
the texts all at once "showed somewhat more variability in their
interpretations", which he attributed to "more careless reading
on the part of the subjects offering an interpretation only at
the end" (Rumelhart, 1981).
What happens when one's usual strategy cannot be used? It
is possible that the Inference Manager has several sets of rules
from which to choose, and that other sets of rules are invoked
when the "default" set fails. For example, a Perseverer who
doubted his initial interpretation would use the Recency strategy
to discover a new interpretation. Our experimental evidence
regarding new interpretations in response to requestioning
(Granger & Holbrook, 1983) leads us to reject this hypothesis.
Instead, we theorize that an individual's Inference Manager has
only one set of rules, certainly more complicated than those
which we have described, with many "if/then/else" alternatives.
One might suspect that the only difference between the two
strategies is which inference is chosen as the default inference.
The evidence does not support such a theory; if a Recency were
making the original default inference after the first concept was
presented, but also making default inferences for later concepts
and simply choosing the later concepts when defaults conflict.
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then Recencies would presumably have little trouble recognizing
the Perseverer's interpretation as an alternative interpretation.
As discussed earlier^ this is not the case/ nor have
reaction-time tests on false recognition items suggested
otherwise (Granger & Holbrookf 1983).
Perseverers and Recencies are only two points in a range of
strategies. An extreme Perseverer makes inferences based on a
preconceived context. This strategy is a kind of paranoid
understanding. An extreme Recency will not make inferencesr and
will not be able to understand text which requires any
higher-level inferences. Still other readers exhibit behavior
akin to both Recency and Perseverer behavior. Vie call these
readers Djeifx; at presentf little is understood about the
strategies used by Deferrers.
5.0 Summary and Conclusions
We have presented evidence for processes of story
comprehension which include the set of rules used by most story
understanding programs, and an additional set of rules which
accounts for interpretations which these programs would not be
able to make.
Our prototype model is far from finished. One limitation is
that it uses simplistic representations. For example, the
representations do not include knowledge about which plans are
appropriate for a goal, nor do they include knowledge about the
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possible conditional outcomes of plans. Questions re-presented
to STRATEGIST will not result in another interpretation of
events. These are all extensions to the system which are planned
for the future.
STRATEGIST is primarily a model of human understanding.
There are still many questions to be answered about how people
interpret text. Our experiments have yet to reveal all of the
different strategies used by readers. We have studied evaluation
metrics and processesr as well as some of the rules which apply
the processes. Future work will focus on specifying more rules,
and more carefully defining and ordering those rules which we
have described here. We also hope to study the application of
these strategies applied to longer texts of many different
genres. This work will not only involve observation of human
subjects; the extended STRATEGIST will be a test-bed which will
allow us to study inference processes and new rules which apply
those processes.
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